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ABSTRACT2 
For a number of decades, a significant amount of resources have been devoted to 
supporting Irish industrial policy interventions.  There has, however, been a distinct 
lack of evaluation of such interventions. Evaluation should consider what would have 
happened in the absence of assistance. To produce an assessment of this counter-
factual involves considering the concepts of deadweight and displacement.  Jointly 
these concepts facilitate an assessment of the additional impact of financial assistance 
provided by the public sector. Despite the widespread recognition amongst academics 
and policymakers alike regarding the need to evaluate, the issue of how to evaluate 
(methodology) continues to be a key challenge.  The prime focus of the current paper 
is to report the findings from the Irish experience of the evaluation of industrial policy 
interventions. In so doing, the paper reflects and considers some of the key 
methodological issues in this field of study.  The paper highlights that, regardless of 
‘what’ is being evaluated, many of the key concepts and frameworks discussed in the 
context of industrial policy evaluation in this paper are highly transferable to varying 
contexts. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Evaluating industrial policy interventions has attracted increasing policy and 
academic attention in recent years.  Despite the widespread consensus regarding the 
need for evaluation, the issue of how to evaluate and the associated methodological 
considerations continues to be an issue of considerable debate.  In the Irish context, 
the increased impetus to evaluate industrial policy interventions would appear to be 
largely driven by the European Union (EU) who have placed emphasis on assessing 
the impact of significant EU transfers (evaluation) and on ensuring that appropriate 
financial management systems have been implemented (accountability). 
For decades, significant resources have been allocated by the Irish government 
towards various types and measures of industrial policy interventions.  Just under €3.3 
billion was provided in direct supports by Irish development agencies3 in the period 
1991 to 20024. Various changes in the focus of Irish industrial policy have taken 
1 Paper presented to “Research and the Knowledge Based Society-Measuring the Link”, European conference on 

good practice in research evaluation and indicators, May 24th 2004, NUI Galway.  

2 Thanks to Gillian Dooley for comments.  The usual disclaimers apply. 

 Industrial Development Authority (IDA); Enterprise Ireland (EI); Shannon Development and Udarás na 
Gaeltachta. 
4 The source of this information is from Forfás Business information system (various years). 
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place over the years, in many cases without the insights of evaluation. For example, 
there has been a shift towards intervention through equity investments from 6.5 per 
cent of all incentive payments to 25.8 per cent in the decade between 1991 and 2001 
followed by a slight decrease to 19.6 per cent in 20025. This shift has taken place 
without reference to many of the factors at work with respect to financial assistance 
interventions (e.g. exploring the counterfactual (deadweight); displacement and other 
key components of overall additionality).  
One of the key studies discussed in this paper is that of Lenihan et al., (2003). The 
Lenihan et al., (2003) study is as a result of commissioned work by a public agency 
(Enterprise Ireland-EI6). It highlights the very fact that, by commissioning the 
academic community to develop and engage in debate regarding the exploration of 
appropriate methodologies to evaluate industrial policy interventions, a public agency 
such as EI is not only an investor but also a consumer of research.   
An important question in any evaluation of the effectiveness of industrial 
development policy is what would have happened in the absence of assistance. To 
produce an assessment of the counter-factual, involves considering two key 
components of additionality, they are, deadweight and displacement.  Growth (e.g. 
increased numbers employed) among the recipients of government financial 
assistance which can be judged to have occurred anyway, in the absence of any 
assistance, is termed deadweight.  Even if one concludes that zero deadweight exists, 
the possibility still remains that assistance provided to a particular firm may displace 
employment in other firms within the economy.  The definition adopted regarding 
economy is very important and the researcher needs to decide from the outset the 
spatial dimension of the displacement concept (i.e. whether displacement is being 
measured at a local, regional, national or international level).  Jointly, deadweight and 
displacement can allow some assessment of the additional impact of financial 
assistance provided by public development agencies.   
The focus of this paper is to report the key findings from the Irish experience of the 
evaluation of industrial policy interventions.  The starting premise is that government 
intervention, in whatever form, should bring about a level of additionality in excess of 
what would have happened anyway. In so doing, the paper draws on two studies, that 
evaluated the impact of financial assistance to firms in the case of two Irish 
development agencies (i.e. Shannon Development7 and Enterprise Ireland).  The 
objective of the paper is not merely to report the findings from these studies, but to 
reflect on the key methodological challenges that face researchers engaged in 
constructing counterfactuals to evaluate policy interventions.  The paper will also 
address the directions that should be taken for evaluation research. Storey (2000) in 
his much publicized “Six Steps to Heaven” paper argued that academics in general 
have been rather slow to address core methodological issues in evaluation research 
and have relied too heavily on mere policy monitoring techniques.  The current paper 
aims to encourage more debate by academics and policymakers on this important 
area. 
5 The source of this information is from Forfás Business information system (various years). 

6 Enterprise Ireland is Ireland’s enterprise development agency.  It works with Irish industry and its partners on

behalf of the Government of Ireland.  

7 Shannon Development is Ireland’s only dedicated regional development agency.  It assumes the role of Enterprise

Ireland in the Shannon region.   
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows:  The next section briefly defines 
the concepts of deadweight and displacement. It also examines evidence of 
deadweight and displacement as highlighted by research in the Irish context. The 
section draws on the work of Lenihan (1999; 2001); Lenihan et al., (2003) and 
Lenihan (2004) to highlight the importance of incorporating these concepts into 
evaluation studies and to highlight the key methodological decisions facing 
researchers in this field of study. Section 3 provides a discussion of the key 
challenges and opportunities facing the Irish evaluation community and, in so doing, 
looks to best-practice international studies.  The paper concludes by emphasising that 
irrespective of ‘what’ is being evaluated, many of the concepts and methodological 
approaches (the ‘how’ to evaluate) are transferable to varying contexts and policy 
instruments.   
2. 	 DEFINITION AND EVIDENCE OF DEADWEIGHT AND 
DISPLACEMENT. 
Deadweight as defined in this paper refers to the degree to which projects would have 
gone ahead anyway without financial assistance from a development agency. 
‘Degrees’ of deadweight are measured by time, location and scale (or a combination 
of these). Minimising deadweight should be one of the key objectives of all 
government interventions with the notion being that the government should be seen as 
a lender of last resort.  Even if ‘zero deadweight’ exists there still remains the 
possibility that assistance allocated to one firm displaces jobs elsewhere in the 
economy (however defined e.g. local, regional or national economy)8. Most 
commentators would concur with the definitions as outlined above.  The focus on 
degrees or levels of deadweight is particularly insightful given that the vast amount of 
studies merely distinguish between ‘full’ or ‘zero’ deadweight whereas in reality 
deadweight may vary along a continuum with various levels of ‘partial’ deadweight 
lying along this continuum as measured by time, scale, location etc (Lenihan 1999; 
2001). However, McEldowney (1997) argued that although the concepts have much 
validity, it is in their application and treatment that problems and challenges may 
occur. The remainder of this section draws on evidence form the Lenihan (1999; 
2001; 2004) and Lenihan et al., (2003) studies. 
2.1 	 Evaluating the Effects of Shannon Development Industrial Support  
Lenihan (1999) examined grant assistance awarded to indigenous firms by Shannon 
Development in 1995. Two components of additionality-deadweight and 
displacement were used to aid the evaluation process.  The prime methodological 
approach adopted was that of the self-assessment approach, involving in-depth face-
to-face interviews with the managing directors of firms that received grants from the 
regional development agency in 1995.  The interview technique was thus employed in 
order to explore the ‘counter-factual’ scenario9. As frequently outlined (King 1990; 
8 For an in-depth discussion of the concepts as outlined above, the reader should refer to Lenihan (1999; 2001). 
9 The main methodological options available to researchers setting out to build the necessary counterfactuals to 
estimate the additionality of government policy are: Shift-share analysis; control groups (some of which incorporate 
selection and assistance effects); cost-benefit analysis; and a ‘self assessment’ approach using survey techniques 
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Lenihan 1999; 2001; Lenihan et al., 2003; PA Cambridge Economic Consultants Ltd 
1993; Swales 1997 amongst others) there are intrinsic difficulties associated with this 
technique when used in this regard which is commonly referred to as ‘respondents 
effect’, that is, the fact that respondents (firms) may purposely exaggerate (in either 
an upwards or downwards direction) the impact of financial assistance from an 
external influence, such as a development agency. More precisely, respondents may 
exaggerate the impact of assistance for fear that they may reduce their chances of 
receiving repeat assistance (if they were not deemed by the development agency as 
really meriting assistance the first time round).  On the other hand, other recipients 
may be likely to play down the impact of assistance attributing success to themselves 
and their own personal characteristics (such as own motivation; education; business 
idea etc). To ensure that respondents offered a ‘consistent counterfactual scenario’ 
and adapted as easily as possible to the hypothetical line of questioning regarding 
assistance received from Shannon Development, several measures were undertaken in 
the study (for a discussion of these measures refer to Lenihan 1999 and Lenihan et al., 
2003). Data emanating from the interviews were then used to obtain estimates of 
deadweight and displacement in the Shannon region of Ireland.   
Lenihan (1999) defined deadweight as the degree to which projects would have gone 
ahead anyway without assistance from Shannon Development in 1995.  This 
definition of deadweight takes account of the various degrees or levels of deadweight 
as measured by time, location and scale. The issue here is that of which projects 
would have gone ahead but in a different form, for example scaled down version or in 
a different location or at a later date, without the assistance.  More precisely, 
respondents were asked: 
“In the absence of grant assistance from Shannon Development in 1995 would you have 
(choose one option only)? 
(a) Gone ahead as now unchanged, that is, same scale, time and location. 
(b) Gone ahead at a different location but otherwise unchanged. 
(c) Gone ahead at a later date but otherwise unchanged 
(that is, delayed the project). 
(d) Gone ahead on a reduced scale but otherwise unchanged. 
(e) Abandoned the project”. 
When respondents said that in the absence of the grant their projects would have gone 
ahead elsewhere, on a smaller scale, or at a later date, they were asked for precise 
details.  These questions facilitated estimates of ‘partial’ versus ‘pure’ degrees of 
deadweight and helped to provide a picture of what was most likely to have happened if 
the award had not been made” (p.310) 
One of the main contributions of the Lenihan (1999) paper is the fact that the 
methodological framework adopted does not merely reduce the issue of deadweight to 
one or two simple counterfactual-type questions (as is the case in a number of studies 
including Segal Quince Wicksteed, 1989; King, 1990; Sheehan, 1993 amongst 
others). The norm (when deadweight is examined in evaluation studies) is that ‘such 
questions ask respondents to indicate whether in the absence of grant assistance they 
would have undertaken the particular investment project under investigation’ 
(McEldowney, 1997, p.184). It is our view that McEldowney (1997) was correct 
when he argued that ‘…….this type of approach is an oversimplistic one to adopt, 
(postal, telephone or face-to face interviews).  For a discussion of the pros and cons associated with each refer to 
Lenihan (2001). 
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especially when one considers the complexity of some decisions that have to be taken 
by organisations’ (p. 184). For this reason, the Lenihan (1999) study did not merely 
pose the question of ‘what would have happened in the absence of grant assistance’ 
but followed it up with more detailed direct questions which relate to timing, scale 
and location of the project. In addition, the approach adopted (Lenihan 1999) also 
incorporated other ‘indicators’ of deadweight questions into the analysis as will be 
discussed later in this section. 
The key contribution of the innovative approach first developed by Lenihan (1999) is 
that the questioning employed during face-to-face interviews helped to ‘unpack’ 
estimates of ‘partial’ versus ‘pure’ (full) degrees of deadweight and helped to provide 
a picture of what was most likely to have happened if the award had not been made. 
Option (a) as outlined above implies ‘pure’ deadweight (i.e., the project would have 
gone ahead anyway completely unchanged in the absence of assistance).  Options (b) 
(c) and (d) all imply varying degrees of ‘partial’ deadweight.  Finally, option (e) 
implies ‘zero’ deadweight (i.e., project would have been completely abandoned in the 
absence of assistance).  These ‘partial’ deadweight assumptions are subsequently 
quantifiably incorporated into the analysis10. As a follow-up question, respondents 
were also probed regarding access to and anticipated success with respect to acquiring 
alternative sources of funding.  To minimise deadweight firms should be able to 
demonstrate to the development agency that all other sources of finance have been 
exhausted (see Hart and Scott, 1994 and Heijs, 2003). The adoption of direct and 
indirect questions to deadweight is considered imperative.  This is aptly summarised 
by Heijs (2003) when he argued that: 
“Some of the firms are prone to overestimate the importance of the public support

measurement, especially in the case of direct questions.  The use of several 

questions to analyse the freerider behaviour is based not only on their

complementarity but could also serve as a control system for the reliability and the 

coherence of the answers’ ( p. 451)11. 

In summary, the Lenihan (1999) study derived the following deadweight estimates: 53 
per cent of firms reported ‘pure’ deadweight, with only 10.4 per cent reporting ‘zero’ 
deadweight.  When the partial deadweight assumptions and categories are accounted 
for, the overall deadweight estimate rises to 78.4 per cent, that is, 78.4 per cent of the 
additional jobs would have occurred anyway.  Thus, additionality net of deadweight is 
21.6 per cent of the jobs created12. The importance of incorporating ‘partial’ 
deadweight is actually quantifiable when one compares the ‘pure’ deadweight 
estimate of 53.2 per cent with that of 73.2 per cent when partial deadweight is taken 
into account. Any policy decisions based on the former are obviously less accurate 
than the latter. Interestingly, this high deadweight estimate is confirmed by the other 
indicators of deadweight employed in this study.  For example, it is generally believed 
(see Sheehan, 1993) that if grants are an integral part of the firms investment 
appraisal, then this provides a good indicator that they are important to the firm.  On 
the other hand, if they are not incorporated then it is likely that they had little 
10 The sensitivity of the deadweight estimates derived obviously depends on the methodology and 
associated definitions used. 
11 Note by the term ‘freerider behaviour’ in the above quote, Heijs (2003) means deadweight. 
12 Subsequent work carried out by Lenihan (2001) showed that regardless of firm ownership deadweight 
estimates were high (based on grants received by firms from Shannon Development in 1995).  A deadweight 
estimate of 71.3 per cent was derived in the case of the foreign-owned firms in the sample.   
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influence on the investment decision.  The incorporation of grants into financial 
appraisals thus provides another good indicator of deadweight.  In this study, of the 68 
firms who had undertaken a financial appraisal of their project, 57 per cent did not 
incorporate grants from Shannon Development which would suggest that deadweight 
is of this magnitude.  As alluded to above, another good indicator of deadweight is to 
establish where the survey firms would have obtained the extra funds needed if no 
grant assistance was provided by Shannon Development. The issue here is whether 
they had access to alternative sources of funds (this approach was also adopted by 
Robinson and Wren (1987) and others).  Of the 74 firms that responded to this 
question, 94.6 per cent said that they would have found alternative sources of funding 
in the absence of grant assistance from Shannon Development in 1995.  When this is 
used as an indicator, deadweight appears to be even higher.   
The second element in the calculation of additionality of Shannon Development 
assistance is displacement.  It should be anticipated from the outset that estimating 
displacement is no easy task.  As Jackson (1990) states “the tracing of displacement 
effects is methodologically very difficult whether the effects being studied are local or 
distant” (p. 52).  To examine regional displacement was an obvious choice in the case 
of Shannon Development given that Shannon Development is a regional development 
agency. The approach adopted (Lenihan, 1999) was to establish the extent to which 
sales by Shannon Development assisted firms displace output from other 
local/regional firms rather than national firms or imports.  The assumption here is 
that, where most competitors are known to be situated in the local or regional areas, 
there is a strong assumption that displacement will occur within the assisted area, that 
is, the Shannon region. However, where competitors are located abroad or in an area 
of Ireland outside of the Shannon region, there is a presumption of no displacement of 
assisted-area jobs. In the current study, displacement is estimated at 4.2 per cent.  In 
other words 4.2 per cent of sales from Shannon Development assisted companies 
displace output and jobs from other Shannon region companies13. 
In summary, one can conclude that for the particular year in question, deadweight in 
the Shannon region was high. The estimate of displacement on the other hand was 
low. It would appear from this that Shannon Development was effective in diverting 
grant-aided activity away from already saturated sectors. One would also be justified 
in questioning whether such high deadweight and low displacement estimates are 
representative of Irish industrial policy interventions in general.   
2.2 Additionality of Enterprise Ireland Financial Assistance 
Lenihan et al., (2003) undertook a study using the same methodological framework14 
to estimate the impact of financial assistance to Irish firms from EI once again in 
terms of deadweight and displacement. The study developed an approach to estimate 
the net additionality of financial assistance from EI to indigenously-owned firms in 
Ireland for the period 2000 to 2002. In summary, the EI study estimated deadweight 
The estimate of displacement for the foreign-owned firms in the sample was also low at 0.3 per cent. 
14 There was a slight adjustment in the case of deadweight with respect to the partial categories.  Also 
the Lenihan et al., (2003) study offers an alternative robust methodology when  faced with the 
difficulty of using the standard methodology where there exists high employment decline in the 
assisted firms over the study period.   
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to be between 46.2 and 55.8 per cent which, although lower than that found for the 
Shannon Development study, is still high by international comparison as highlighted 
in Table 1. It should be noted that deadweight estimates derived (or assumed) in other 
Irish studies range from 45-80 per cent15. 
Table 1: Deadweight Estimates Derived in International Studies 
Authors Evaluation of What Where Deadweight 
(Year) (Focus of Study) Estimate 
Public Sector Management Research Urban Development Grants (UDG) UK 57% 
Unit (PSMRU) programme 
(1988) 
PA Cambridge Economic Consultants Regional Selection Assistance (RSA) UK 21% 
(1993) Scheme 
Public and Corporate Economic Business Links UK 38% 
Consultants (PACEC) 
(1998) 
Hart and Scott Local Economic  NI 8%-32% 
(1994) Development Unit (LEDU) assistanc 
policies to small  
firms in Northern Ireland (NI) 
Sheehan  Capital Grants to NI 59% 
(1993) manufacturing firms in approx. 
Northern Ireland 
Monk 
(1990) 
Enterprise Board Investment UK 46% 
Davenport et al 
(1998) 
Technology for Business 
Growth (TGB) Programme 
New 
Zealand 
37.5% 
approx. 
Estimates of displacement in the Enterprise Ireland study were estimated to be 
between 4.4 to 12.2 per cent which, although higher than the Shannon Development 
study, are still low by international comparison16. 
Table 2:  Displacement Estimates Derived in International Studies 
Author Evaluation of What Where Displacement 
(Year) (Focus of Study) Estimate 
King Regional Selective Assistance UK 27% 
(1990) (RSA) Scheme 
Hart and Scott Local Economic Development Unit (LEDU) NI 40% 
(1994) assistance policies to small firms in Northern 
Ireland 
Monk 
(1990) 
Enterprise Board Investment UK 10% 
Tervo Regional Development Grants Finland 23% 
(1990) 
Robinson et al Regional Development Grants (RDG) UK 27% 
(1987) Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) 
Felsenstein and Fleisher Public Assistance Program –small scale  Israel 64% 
(2002) Entrepreneurship in peripheral areas. 
15 Refer to IEU (1999a; 1999b; 2000) and Honohan (1998). 
16 A word of caution needs to be exercised when comparing estimates of deadweight and displacement across 
studies in that a variety of methodological approaches are adopted.  Nevertheless, employing international 
studies as a benchmark is useful. 
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Other Irish studies during this time period (in light of the growing recognition of the 
need for evaluation in Ireland over the last 6/7 year period) also either derived or 
assumed high deadweight estimates by international standards as highlighted by Table 
3. While many Irish studies also refer to or acknowledge the existence of 
displacement to date, Lenihan (1991; 2001) and Lenihan et al., (2003) are the only 
studies to have actually derived displacement estimates.  Much more research is 
merited to gain firmer estimates of displacement over time and across agencies. 
Table 3. Deadweight Estimates Derived in other Irish Studies 
Authors Evaluation of What Where Deadweight 
(Year) (Focus of Study) Estimate/ 
Deadweight 
assumption 
Forfás (2003) Start-up project 
Expansion project 
ROI17 
Greater 
80% 
80% 
High Potential Start-up project Dubin 60% 
region 
Forfás (2003) Start-up project 
Expansion project 
High Potential Start-up project 
ROI-
Rest of 
Ireland 
70% 
75% 
60% 
Forfás (2003) Start-up project 
Expansion project 
High Potential Start-up project 
ROI­
BMW* 
regions 
65% 
70% 
60% 
Honohan  Key Issues of Cost-benefit ROI 80% 
(1998) Methodology for Irish Industrial 
Policy 
IEU (1999) R&D Policy and Interventions ROI 50% 
IEU (1999) Micro Enterprise Supports ROI 45% 
IEU (2000) Seed and Venture Capital Scheme ROI 60% 
*Border Midlands Western Region. 
2.3 Explaining Deadweight Estimates 
The Irish deadweight studies have been useful in terms of understanding and deriving 
headline estimates of deadweight. They have also highlighted the contribution that 
can be made from detailed evaluations of industrial policy. In the Irish case, a 
sufficient amount of evidence regarding the extent of deadweight exists to suggest 
that this is an issue that should be addressed by Irish industrial policymakers. 
However, Lenihan (2004) has argued that it is no longer sufficient to merely derive 
estimates of deadweight and displacement and to discuss their consequences. The 
focus of attention should also be on establishing specific firm factors (e.g., size of 
firm; type of firm ownership; type of assistance received) that influence these 
estimates.  It is only then that real policy improvements and learning can occur.  To 
this end, the explicit focus of the Lenihan (2004) paper was to ascertain whether 
certain firm characteristics are likely to influence the likelihood of deadweight and/or 
displacement effects.  Given the plethora of evidence that exists regarding the 
prevalence of high deadweight in an Irish context, discussion here will focus only on 
the insights provided on the deadweight issue from the Lenihan (2004) study.   
17 ROI-Republic of Ireland. 
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Employing data from the Shannon Development study referred to previously (but in 
this case including also the foreign-owned firms in the sample giving an overall 
sample size of 103 firms), Lenihan (2004) developed a Logit (predictive) regression 
model for deadweight18. The objective of the econometric modelling exercise was to 
establish whether certain basic characteristics of grant-assisted firms could predict 
probable deadweight effects. It is essential, from a policy perspective, to establish if 
certain characteristics of grant-aided firms increase the likelihood of deadweight.  
In the case of deadweight, it was found that grant type, size of firm, whether the 
investment appraisal included grant and whether firm was a first-time or repeat grant 
recipient all impacted on the level of deadweight. More precisely, for the particular 
year in question, firms that received employment grants were more likely ceteris 
paribus to influence deadweight than firms that received grants for other purposes. 
Firms that did not include the grant they received as part of their investment appraisal 
were more likely to cause deadweight ceteris paribus. Smaller firms were less likely 
to influence deadweight than larger firms.  The econometric modelling application 
clearly demonstrated the benefits of the methodological approach employed and 
highlighted some interesting results.  This however, was merely the first step in this 
type of analysis. The predictive modelling framework developed may also be useful 
for policymakers in terms of providing a type of ex-ante appraisal/evaluation template 
which may in turn be useful for their internal appraisal/evaluation procedures.  For 
example, if over time, it was to be demonstrated that firms with certain characteristics 
were more associated with deadweight effects, then this should act as a potential 
signal to agencies to probe whether such applicants are genuinely in need of 
assistance.   
3.	 KEY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FACING THE IRISH 
EVALUATION COMMUNITY. 
3.1 Key challenges 
Based on the discussion in the previous sections, one might conclude that estimating 
the additionality of industrial assistance in Ireland has become a well-established and 
widely utilised evaluation practice. This is certainly not the case and there are very 
few methodologically robust studies in Ireland that address the measurement issues 
associated with deadweight and displacement.  Further, the deadweight phenomenon 
is even more complex than discussed above.  The Lenihan et al., (2003) study of EI 
financial assistance to firms highlights some of this complexity.  
During the fieldwork for the EI study it emerged that there may be indirect benefits 
(positive externalities) associated with financial assistance to firms which may to 
some degree help to offset high deadweight estimates (Hart and Lenihan, 2004). 
These positive externalities may include collaboration and international networking 
opportunities, information transfer, the freeing up of internal human and financial 
18 This type of analysis was not possible in the case of the EI study due to the relatively small sample 
size of the assisted population over the study period under investigation.   
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capital (which can then be used in other innovative actions within the firms), or the 
leverage of additional private sector financial support, including formal and informal 
venture capital for example.  The key methodological challenge therefore, is to assess 
the extent to which the presence of positive externalities associated with public sector 
financial assistance to individual firms distorts standard methodologies designed to 
estimate the level of deadweight.  Lenihan et al., (2003) and Hart and Lenihan (2004) 
demonstrate the importance of such issues when estimating deadweight.  The role of 
EI assistance as evidence of due diligence (actual or perceived) and its importance in 
financial leverage was probed during face-to-face interviews with the EI assisted 
firms.  The notion here is that one might anticipate that the true value of EI 
intervention to the firm was not only in terms of direct financial assistance received 
from EI but also in terms of its ability to leverage funds from other sources once it 
could claim that it had EI backing.  Other potential sources of finance (e.g. banks and 
venture capital companies) might feel that this was a viable firm to support, given the 
amount of due diligence associated with EI funding.  Heijs (2003) also refers to the 
indirect advantages to the firm.  More precisely, he outlined: 
“The public support could provide an important signal to the private credit institutions 
–facilitating the possibility to raise other funds-or to other firms by strengthening the 
wider reputation for forming alliances, for marketing products etc” (p. 449). 
When Lenihan et al., (2003) formally calibrated the effect of the leverage factor into 
estimates of deadweight, the deadweight estimate was adjusted downwards by 
between 3 and 7 percentage points.  Other positive externalities such as the likely 
benefits derived from being part of the EI international network (emanating from the 
fact that the firm received assistance from EI in the first instance) were also discussed 
by Lenihan et al., (2003). Although such less tangible impacts were not formally 
calibrated into deadweight estimates (therein lies a key methodological challenge for 
researchers in this field of research), the study nevertheless highlights their 
significance.  Therefore, care must be taken in the construction of evaluation 
methodologies which seek to assess the level of net additionality associated with 
public sector programmes and initiatives.  The key point here is that the process of 
providing financial assistance to individual firms normally includes a due diligence 
component which many firms find important in their attempts to raise additional 
private sector finance. 
Further, in the case of EI assistance, deadweight estimates should also account for the 
fact that some financial assistance received is repayable.  However, methodologically, 
this is very challenging given the complete absence of this type of assistance in 
evaluation studies to date. The repayability issue definitely complicates deadweight 
estimates.  In particular, there is a need to be sensitive to the precise nature of the 
package of financial assistance provided to firms by an agency such as EI in that they 
comprise a variety of forms of assistance (e.g. repayable equity shares) which cannot 
simply be categorised as ‘grant aid’.  To develop estimates of deadweight which 
exhibit some sensitivity to the concept of a repayable grant regime are necessary but 
have not been the focus of evaluation research to date.  This lies among the most 
interesting aspects and challenges of future lines of research in this field of study.   
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3.2 Best-practice internationally 
Considerable progress has been made in recent years regarding the evaluation of Irish 
industrial policy initiatives. While much of this has been linked to complying with 
EU regulations, there is a growing awareness of the value of such research in view of 
increased fiscal constraints and the fundamental principles of ‘opportunity cost’ and 
‘accountability’. Nevertheless, in moving forward, it is imperative that we look 
beyond the Irish context to best-practice international studies in terms of developing 
appropriate methodologies for future evaluation studies.   
Although not employed to date in the context of Irish industrial policy interventions, 
best-practice evaluation research is pointing towards the use of econometric treatment 
models (e.g. 2-step Heckman models) which account for ‘selection’ and ‘assistance 
effects’ (see Roper and Hart, 2003; Wren and Storey, 2002; Roper and Hewitt-
Dundas, 2001; Roper et al., 2001 and Turok and Raco, 2000).  Two types of selection 
bias should be taken into account. First, on behalf of the applicant (subsequent 
successful recipient of financial assistance) who may possess certain characteristics 
(for example, highly motivated, well educated, certain age, certain type of background 
etc) may be more likely to apply for grant assistance in the first instance.  Second, 
bias may emanate from the fact that development agencies may in all probability be 
more inclined to provide financial assistance to certain types of firms than others (e.g. 
firms whom they consider to have growth potential-notion of backing or picking 
winners). 
Carrying out a full scale longitudinal set of case-studies; control group analysis19; 
selection and assistance modelling and predictive modelling are methodological 
minimum standards now becoming imbedded within some of the evaluation work on 
industrial policy in Ireland and most of such work in the rest of the EU.   
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper has highlighted the importance of accounting for the phenomena of 
deadweight and displacement (two key components of overall additionality) in any 
impact evaluation.  Whilst the discussion in this paper has focussed on financial 
assistance provided, similar evaluation procedures are appropriate for a much wider 
range of government programmes.  Without doubt however, focussing on financial 
assistance to industry has the advantage of being more amenable to evaluation than 
the other types of ‘softer’ supports (Georghiou, 2002).  The fact that money is a 
measurable input and that financial assistance (grant) may involve dedicated 
personnel facilitates measurement. 
Indifferent of ‘what’ is being evaluated, the concepts of deadweight and displacement 
should be central to any evaluation which seeks to estimate the net additionality of a 
particular intervention. The methodological approaches discussed in this paper have 
19 The authors are currently working with EI to construct aggregate control group analysis for assisted and non-
assisted firms in Ireland to assess the extent to which robust estimates of deadweight can be generated.  Given 
the scale of assistance to Irish industry in recent years the contamination effect is seen as a major challenge to 
this methodological approach – i.e., creating genuine controls is a problem is such a policy intensive 
environment. 
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broad-based applicability and the methodological lessons are transferable. The 
methodological approaches discussed provide rigorous, structured but at the same 
time user-friendly approaches to evaluation.  This is important given that the reason 
that evaluation went out of favour in the late 1970s was due to the perception that the 
techniques were too complicated and too far removed from reality. 
There are many challenges facing researchers in this field of study.  There is no single 
best evaluation framework in the same way there is no single best economic policy 
instrument.  No one expects existing programmes to be up-rooted the moment 
analysis shows that they are ineffective.  Much more modest hopes are in order which 
seek to improve the quality of the debate and to identify under-discussed policy 
options. 
Evaluation is still very much in its infancy in Irish academic and policymaking 
circles. As the adoption of evaluative approaches is set to increase, the findings of 
this paper should provide timely and valuable lessons to those charged with the task 
of carrying out such evaluations. 
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